

# Portugal and the End of Ultra-Colonialism 2

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A preliminary remark on method should be made. The account which follows does not attempt to give an exhaustive description of the whole Portuguese colonial system. The method chosen is rather to select various key sectors which appear to be privileged expressions of the whole, and to show their rigorous coherence. An initial criterion guided the selection of the areas examined: they are those where a marked differential is evident between the Portuguese example and the normal colonial pattern. It is through the specific characteristics of Portuguese colonialism that a model of the whole will be suggested.

## **I. Forced Labour**

The most notorious single feature of the Portuguese African colonies is their systematic use of forced labour. It is this which immediately identifies the Portuguese variant of colonialism as against all others. Official statistics and statutes are sparser and more misleading in this area than in any other. A great deal of the evidence of the use of forced labour inevitably comes from foreign observers. However these, together with occasional involuntary official admissions and the open rationale of exploitation, combine to form a picture which is, within limits, precise and consistent.

Labour in the Portuguese colonies outside the African subsistence economy is divided into four categories: correctional, obligatory, contract and voluntary.

1. *Correctional Labour*. This is a legal penalty inflicted on Africans who infringe the Criminal or Labour Codes. It is also imposed in Mozambique for failure to pay the native head tax (in Angola the penalty is obligatory labour).

2. *Obligatory Labour*. This may be imposed by the government for public works, when voluntary workers are insufficient. The only groups formally exempted from it are those under 14 or over 60, the sick and the invalid, Africans already in employment, recognised chiefs, workers on their first six months home after contract work,

\*The system is described as it stood on the outbreak of the Angolan insurrection in March 1961.

sepoys (who are often in charge of the labour brigades)—and women. Obligatory labour is used mainly on port installations, railroads, sanitation works, and road-building and maintenance. All witnesses agree that despite the formal regulations, the use of women and children on local road-details is absolutely general in the colonies. Basil Davidson, visiting Angola in 1954, wrote:

“Rural roads are invariably built and maintained by the unpaid conscripted labour of the people of the area through which the road passes. These people have to furnish not only their labour but also their own food, and often enough their own tools. Since many men are absent on forced labour elsewhere, the local chief or herdman in whose hands responsibility for the road is left will frequently call up women and quite small children. That is why one sees women with babies on their backs, and pregnant women, and quite small girls, scraping at roads with primitive hoes and carrying cupfuls of earth in little bark containers on their heads, while their headman or his ‘responsible’ sits nearby moodily hugging his knees.”\*

Gwendolen Carter, who was in Angola in 1959, wrote in almost identical terms:

“The unpaved roads on which I drove were a great deal worse than any I had used in 3,000 mile auto trip in the Congo. Nevertheless, there are plenty of road-works going on in Angola—but almost entirely by women and children. In several places, I saw African women with road-tools in their hands hacking away at rough bits in the surface and filling in holes. Once I saw an African overseer with his ‘badges of office’ (a club and a whip), largely for show but occasionally used.”\*\*

3. *Contract Labour*. This is the most economically important form of forced labour in the Portuguese colonies, and the one which has been primarily intended by the term in most recent discussions of it. Any African who cannot prove that he has been employed for at least six months of the previous year is liable to compulsory labour for the state or private employers. In Mozambique, a government circular (566/5–7) of 1947 laid down the conditions for proof that an African was not “idle”, and so liable to contract labour:

- (i) Self-employed in a profession, commerce or industry.
- (ii) Permanent employment by the State, administrative corps or private persons.
- (iii) At least six months employment by the above.
- (iv) Employment within the last six months in the Union of South Africa or the Rhodesias under a legal contract.
- (v) Cattle-raising with at least 50 head of cattle.
- (vi) Registration as an “agricultor africano”.
- (vii) First year of reserve status after completion of military service.

In Angola, a report by the Governor-General to the Minister of the Overseas Provinces in 1953 stated: “In accordance with the established regulations every able-bodied male *indigena* must be able to prove that he is living on the proceeds of his own work; and it is

\*Basil Davidson, ‘The African Awakening’, London, 1955.

\*\*Gwendolen Carter, ‘Independence for Africa’, London, 1960.

understood that he is not doing so—and that therefore work must be found for him—in the case of (a) those who have not put themselves in a position to pay the taxes due to the state; (b) those who do not appear capable of obtaining for themselves the means which are indispensable for the feeding, clothing and housing of themselves and their families; (c) those who do not live in sanitary houses.”

Both sets of definitions are framed in such a way as to include potentially almost the entire male African population of the two colonies. The vagueness of the Angolan regulations are flagrant. The Mozambique definitions are equally, if less evidently, vicious. Five out of the seven proofs of non-idleness (Nos. i to v) involve prior integration into the colonial economic and administrative system. The force of the regulations thus falls on the last two categories: agriculture and live-stock breeding in the African rural economy. The definitions in these expose a literal 95% or more of the peasantry to forced labour. There are only some 600,000 head of African-owned cattle in Mozambique—hence, even with a maximum distribution of 50 head per herd, only 12,000 Africans could be protected by this rubric. In fact, of course, the number is much smaller. Equally, the number of Africans who receive the State certificate of “agricultor africano” is tiny, as only those who possess ploughs and other farm machinery have any effective chance of being granted one. Marvin Harris concludes:

“It can be said with absolute certainty, therefore, that less than 5% of the native, able-bodied males in Southern Mozambique are legally entitled to remain within the confines of their homesteads.”

If this is the extent of the liability for contract labour, what is contract labour itself? It is used indifferently by the State or by private concerns. The administration issues licences for recruitment to agents or to companies direct. These licences are of two kinds—“with facilities” or “without facilities”. With the first the agent contracts without actual administrative help, with the second the local administrative official sponsors and materially assists the recruiter—technically only providing him with names and addresses, but in practice often using intimidation and coercion to secure the quota for which the recruiter has a licence, in return for substantial bribes. All witnesses agree on the universal corruption engendered by the system:

“The system works more or less like this. An up-country planter informs the government that he will be needing so many men, and these are provided for him by the local chefe de posto, or District Officer. Native recruiters go out into the villages, and collect the necessary number of men, who are then turned over to the planter. But the planter, to be sure of getting all the recruits he needs, usually has to pay off ten times the contract labourer’s wages for six months. Nothing more vicious can be imagined . . .”\*

The complement of corruption is violence. The Chefo de Posto, in receipt of his bribe, instructs the village headman—a creature of the

\*John Gunther, ‘Inside Africa’, London, 1955.

administration—to round up the required quota from his village, which the headman does by force if necessary. “If the village seems slow about meeting its quota, the police may be sent to secure the requisite number. Even married men are sometimes hauled out of their home at night and sent away for nine months to a year’s work on a particular project. Moreover, one term of such work is not sufficient to prevent another one later . . .”\*

There is no question of resistance on the headman’s part: “Chieftains who are inefficient in their propaganda (i.e. for recruitment) are vulnerable to prosecution for collecting taxes and fines. This is a widespread but illegal practice which the administrators tolerate in order to gain the maximum co-operation from the tribal authorities in the procurement of forced labour.”\*\* In the case of the large companies or plantation, the company simply certifies the government of its needs, the government calculates the total number of Africans available at that time and allots the company a quota in terms of it, passing the word down to the *chefe de posto* all over the country to round the men up. In 1954 the chief of the Native Affairs Department told Basil Davidson that the Government allowed a “theoretical average” of 33 contract workers for every 100 hectares (220 acres) of plantation.

Wages vary according to area and employer, but never rise above token levels. Barnes in 1928 reckoned that rural wages in Angola were about 2½ to 3 escudos a day (7½ d. to 9 d.). Davidson in 1954, estimating price-increases at 300% in the intervening period, reported that pay on the plantations was about 4 escudos a day (1/-d.). In Mozambique, forced labourers receive the minimum legal wage of the area they work in—which ranges from 1/3d. a day in the Sul de Save to less than 6d. in the remote northern areas of Vila Cabral and Macondes.

4. *Voluntary Labour*. Voluntary workers contract directly with their employers, instead of being recruited via the administration. The main practical difference between voluntary and contract labour is that the first is usually carried out in the region where the worker lives. The wages for voluntary labour can be even lower than for contracted labour (see Davidson pp. 210, 216). In Mozambique, Harris thinks that the threat of contract labour is such as to force workers into voluntary labour under more or less indistinguishable conditions (with the one advantage that they work at home). “It can be said with near certainty that about all of the African male workers employed by European agricultural enterprises are *shibalos* (i.e. forced labourers).” In 1953, official figures showed that the average agricultural wage in Mozambique was less than 5 escudos a day (1/3d.). “It is a fact well known among the European planters that Africans will not voluntarily accept such wages when alternative forms of wage employment in Mozambique’s cities and in the neighbouring territories pay two to three times as much under better working conditions.”

\*Marvin Harris, ‘Portugal’s African Wards’, American Committee on Africa, 1958.

In addition to these forms of indenture, Portuguese Africa is characterised by still another two types of forced labour.

5. *Forced Cultivation.* In northern Mozambique, the main crop is cotton. Twelve Portuguese companies have monopoly concessions over the whole area within this territory. Africans are given seed by the companies, assigned acreage quotas by the administration, and must cultivate cotton on their land. When the crop is picked, they must sell it to the companies at fixed prices, pegged well below free market levels. Within concessionary territory, no other wage labour of any kind is permitted. The whole process is coercive: the African has no choice at any stage. The land forcibly converted to cotton cultivation is subtracted from the subsistence economy. The result is frequently famine. "Such a phenomenal rise (i.e. in cotton production) . . . had an immediate boomerang effect of reducing almost equally phenomenally the natural native crops. Groundnuts, maize, manioc, kaffir corn, and beans all reached almost famine production figures in the north of the colony."\* The Catholic bishop of Beira in a recent book wrote; "I know a region which used to be a granary for lands afflicted with hunger. After the cotton campaign was begun there, the fertile fields ceased to supply food for the neighbouring population and the people of the region itself also began to feel hunger. There belongs to my diocese a region in which for six months the black spectre of hunger reaped the lives of the inhabitants." The crop itself is bought at derisory prices: in 1956, 519,000 African sellers were paid an average of £4 a person for a year's crop. The Bishop of Beira reported that in some districts the African is paid 50 to 90 escudos (14/-d. to 22/6d.) for cotton from land on which he could grow foodstuffs worth 46 to 80 times as much—2,000 to 4,000 escudos (£2 10s. to £5). He concludes "What difference is there between the activities of these natives and those who work as contracted labourers on the farms? None. Or better yet, a difference does exist: the contract labourers receive clothing, food and board; here, nothing of this is supplied; whether the farm produces or does not produce, the contract labourer receives a salary; here they receive the price of the cotton if the seeding is successful, and in case it isn't, as occurs in bad years for this kind of crop, they receive nothing."

6. *Migrant Labour.* In 1909, the Mozambique-Transvaal convention was signed, and it was renewed in 1928, 1934, 1936 and 1940. In its present form it provides for an annual import of a maximum of 100,000 Mozambique Africans to the Transvaal goldmines in return for which 47.5% of all seaborne import traffic to the Johannesburg area must pass through Lourenco Marques, and some 340,000 cases of citrus fruit from the Union must be exported through it. The Portuguese government is paid about £1 18s. for each recruit, and is given half of the recruit's wages for repayment to him on his return: no contract can be for longer than 18 consecutive months, and repatriation is automatic. A subsidiary of the Transvaal Chamber of Mines, the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WNLA) has a monopoly of recruitment south of the 22nd parallel in

\*Marvin Harris, *op. cit.*

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Mozambique. As the mine wages, low as they are, are higher than the pay for contract labour in Mozambique, there is no difficulty about recruitment. "When the hunt for shibalos is intensified in a particular district, the recruiting posts of the WNLA, which are strategically placed throughout southern Mozambique, are suddenly deluged with Africans anxious to sign mine contracts. Since even the low wages paid by the mines are several fold greater than the prevailing agricultural wage within Mozambique, the *indigena* regards emigration as his best defence against the shibalo system." The situation of the Mozambique African is so desperate that there is a considerable volume of clandestine emigration to the Rand, in addition to the legal flow of some 75,000 a year. In 1954 there were 173,433 registered Mozambique Africans alone in the Transvaal (there are quite certainly a great many unregistered as well). The Mozambique recruits on the Rand form the hard core of the mines' labour force. They are both the most regular and the most docile source of supply. The clandestine emigrants outside the mines (some 60,000) are equally welcome to South African employers: fear of repatriation makes them amenable to exceptionally low wages by South African standards.

North of the 22nd parallel and south of the Zambesi, Mozambique labour is recruited for Southern Rhodesia. The numbers are as great: in 1954 178,870 recruits were working in Southern Rhodesia. Finally, another 6,000 or so are shipped off to work on the plantations of Sao Thomé. Allowing for a total of 50,000 clandestine emigrants from the province, some 400,000 Mozambique Africans would be working outside the province, or two-thirds of the total male work-force in Southern Mozambique. Marcelo Caetano, then a high official in the Salazar regime, estimated the number at some 500,000 in 1954.

In Angola, about 15,000 to 20,000 Africans are legally recruited for labour in Northern Rhodesia and South West Africa a year. Illegal emigration, particularly to the Congo, has probably been much higher.

Contracted labour outside the Portuguese colonies is more attractive to Africans than inside them. But both the conditions of migrant labour and the pressure behind it, reveal it as differing only in degree, not in structure, from forced labour under Portuguese conditions. The wages are still brutally low: 3/- a day for an underground miner, 2/3d. for a surface worker; lower in fact than they were 60 years ago. Casualties are heavy: over 80,000 Mozambique Africans have died on the Rand in the last 60 years (the mortality rate was 67.6 per 1,000 in the first decade). Duffy says flatly: "The Mozambique South African Convention is an international projection of contract labour",\* and the judgment is valid for migrant labour from Portuguese Africa generally.

The human oppression involved in Portuguese forced labour is of a brutality and intensity that has no parallel anywhere else on the continent. It is the absolute, literal nadir of African misery. The

\*James Duffy, 'Portuguese Africa', Harvard, 1959.

evidence is incontrovertible: more Africans emigrate, legally or illegally, from the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique than from any other areas in the whole of Africa. Official calculations (Marcelo Caetano) estimate 500,000 for each territory. The real total is probably higher. There are Angolan emigrants in the ex-French Congo, the ex-Belgian Congo, in Northern Rhodesia, in South West Africa; there are Mozambique emigrants in Transvaal, Natal, Southern Rhodesia, Nyasaland and Tanganyika. There are emigrants from Portuguese Guinea in Guinea and Senegal. The population density of Nyasaland itself may be partly due to an excessive hidden influx of Africans from Mozambique. A table of emigration compiled for selected south, central and east African territories from 1952–1954 shows that emigration from Mozambique alone almost equalled the total of all the other territories combined:

*(Numbers in thousands)*

Sudan (to Uganda) . . . . .	2.6
Uganda (to Tanganyika, Zanzibar) . . . . .	1.3
Kenya (to Uganda, Tanganyika, Zanzibar) . . . . .	19.1
Tanganyika (to Zanzibar, Nyasaland) . . . . .	29.0
Ruanda-Urundi (to Congo, Tanganyika)* . . . . .	27.4
Congo (to Uganda)†. . . . .	4.2
Northern Rhodesia (to Congo, Tanganyika, S. Rhodesia, Union of South Africa) . . . . .	52.6
Nyasaland (to Tanganyika, Zanzibar, S. Rhodesia, Union of South Africa) . . . . .	109.7
Southern Rhodesia (to Union of South Africa) . . . . .	30.0
Bechuanaland (to N. Rhodesia, S. Rhodesia, Union of South Africa) . . . . .	19.0
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	294.9
 Mozambique (to Zanzibar, Tanganyika, Nyasaland, S. Rhodesia, Union of South Africa) . . . . .	 238.9
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The 1947 report of Henrique Galvao on the condition of Angola is probably overdrawn in places, but it remains the classic verdict on the human society created by forced labour:

“The population flees en masse and deserts the land and its homes and the territories become empty . . . It is clandestine emigration which, ever more rapidly, drains away the peoples of Guinea, Mozambique and Angola; which in Angola is responsible for the grave demographic anaemia one notes in this colony. There stay at home only the old and infirm, the women and children and incapable . . . The physical decadence of the native population is a reality which cannot pass unobserved even by the most casual observer . . . Infant mortality reaches a figure of 60%, and . . . a death-rate as high as 40% is not rare among workers themselves . . . Figures are mute, static. They don’t shout, they don’t tell of pain. One needs to go and see for oneself, one needs to encourage those who want to see . . . The

Government has become the main recruiter and distributor of native labour, to a point where settlers call on the Department of Native Affairs with written demands for 'supply of labour', which they hand in without embarrassment. The term 'supply' (fornecer) is used indifferently of goods or men . . . The idea that the native is simply a beast of burden still prevails; the indifference for the physical and moral health of their labourers is evident . . . In some respects the situation is more grave than that created by pure slavery. Under slavery the bought man, acquired as a head of cattle, was regarded as an asset by his master. He was interested in keeping him healthy and strong and agile in the same way as he would look after his horse or his bull. Today, the native is not bought—he is simply rented from the Government, though he may have the status of a free man. His master could hardly care less if he falls ill or dies as long as he goes on working while he lives . . . When he becomes unable to work or when he dies the master can always ask to be supplied with another labourer . . . Only the dead are really exempt from forced labour."

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Forced labour has at one time or another been used by almost all colonial regimes in Africa. It was particularly flagrant in French Equatorial Africa (Camerun, Ubangi, Tchad) up to 1945, in the form of forced commodity quotas of cotton. Madagascar in the '20s and '30s was as bad. It was widespread in Italian Ethiopia. It still exists in South Africa in the form of penal labour for infringement of pass laws (pay is 9d. a day). But in most cases it was either of only marginal significance in the economy as a whole (administrative drafts for road and hydraulic works in the Congo, the tobacco plantations in the Union), or represented an initial and transitional phase of economic development in the territory. Portuguese Africa is unique both in the continuity and the scale of its use of forced labour.

**Continuity:** Slavery was legally abolished throughout the Portuguese Empire in 1869. The first labour code (of 1878) authorised the coercive contracting of Africans who were judged "vagrants". Thus almost no change ensued on formal abolition: "Practically, free labour did not exist in the colonies. The employer felt less obligation to the contracted labourer than he had formerly to his slaves. The *serviçais* (the contracted labourers) were maintained at subsistence level."

In 1898 a Royal Committee on Portuguese Africa stated that "the State, not only as a Sovereign of semi-barbaric populations, but also as a depository of social authority, should have no scruples in *obliging* and, if necessary, *forcing* (italics in the original) these rude Negroes in Africa, these ignorant Pariahs in Asia, these half-savages in Oceania to work, that is, to better themselves by work, to acquire through work the happiest means of existence, to civilise themselves through work . . ." In 1914 a new labour Code was issued, whose first article read: "Every sound native in the Portuguese colonies is subject under this law to the moral and legal obligation of providing,

by means of work, his sustenance and of progressively bettering his social condition.” In 1906, forced labour on the Sao Thomé cocoa plantation was exposed by Nevinson in his book “A Modern Slavery”, and the scandal was international. In 1909 the Quaker cocoa manufacturer, Cadbury, confirmed Nevinson’s findings in “Labour in Portuguese West Africa”. In 1925 the American sociologist Edward Ross published a detailed report on forced labour in Angola. Since the war the accounts of Davidson, Gunther and Harris (see above) have made it clear that the essential system, informed by the principles of the 1898 report, remains unchanged to this day.

**Scale:** “Forced labour remains the fly-wheel of the country’s whole economy”,\* wrote Davidson in 1954. The image is exact—if anything it understates.

Davidson claims that in 1954, the files of the Native Affairs Department in Luanda (which he was shown) revealed the following proportion of forced to “voluntary” labour :

Contract labour 379,000; Voluntary labour 400,000; Total 779,000. He was later attacked for this by a spokesman for the Portuguese administration who quoted official released figures as 142,674 contract labourers in Angola in 1953, and 99,771 in 1954. But there is no reason to disbelieve Davidson, while there are many for mistrusting government statistics (the latest official figure for 1958, was 130,141 *contratados*). In the absence of other evidence, his figures may be taken as accurate.

In Mozambique, the figures are more accessible and definite:

519,000 cotton conscripts  
100,000 contracted agricultural workers  
400,000 migrant contracted workers

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1,019,000 Total

The total labour force is about 2,094,000 (1954 figures for Mozambique, including migrant workers).

However, the *structural* significance of forced labour completely overshadows its statistical importance. The existence of pure forced labour on this scale has a permanent deforming effect on all other types of labour. The process is clearest in the case of “voluntary” labour. As has been seen, the practical difference between “voluntary” and “contract” work is reduced to a matter of location. In some cases, voluntary work is even paid less than forced labour. The *threat* of forcible displacement is enough to ensure acceptance of inhuman wages and conditions on the spot. In the same way, migrant labour in the Portuguese colonies becomes a refracted mode of forced labour itself. The recruits to the Rand are not simply responding to ordinary economic incentives: their migration is an active flight from a specific oppression—the “contract” system. In its origins, the Rand labour influx was a press-gang affair. Now probably there is little need for

\*Basil Davidson, *op. cit.*

directly coercive recruiting. Not merely because conditions in the mines have improved, but because coercion has *already* been exercised: migrant labour is its effect at one remove. In Portuguese Africa, forced labour is the secret of the most innocent employment, the basis of the best-paid occupation. The violence it introduces into society is a contagion. Immediately or mediately, actually or latently, it settles on everything and deforms it. In the end, violence tends to coincide with the very notion of social relations themselves. The Angolan revolution was to reveal how far this tendency had become reality.

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Portuguese overseas domination has been defined as “ultra-colonialism”, that is, both the most extreme and the most primitive modality of colonialism.\* Forced labour in the Portuguese colonies is the most extreme form of exploitation existent anywhere in Africa. Its human regime is a degradation beyond anything that any other colonialism has produced. But at the same time forced labour, the edifice and emblem of Portuguese colonialism, provides the clearest evidence of its retardation.

Any colonial power in occupation of an underdeveloped territory is faced with an initial problem when it moves to valorize the economic resources of its colony. How is it to mobilize enough manpower to get an efficient apparatus of exploitation working? It is almost invariably confronted with a rural subsistence economy. How is it to siphon off enough labour to start an exchange sector? Almost all the colonial powers began by using some form of coercion: it was the easiest and cheapest solution. Forced labour furnished the primitive accumulation of European colonialism in Africa: in the rubber forests of the Congo basin, in the cotton delta of the Shari-Logone, on the sisal plantations of Tanganyika, a surplus was extracted from peasants wrenched by force from their subsistence farming. At this stage, the degree of capitalization was very small, and allowed for no margin of incentives to be offered the African at all. As capitalization proceeded, the situation changed. Three factors combined to effect a conversion, which is still only partial, to an incentive-driven labour-force. The first was political and external: the role of trade unions, social-democrat and socialist parties in the metropolitan countries. Amelioration of the labour regime at home to some extent influenced revisions overseas. This was not a major factor: in many instances powerful labour movements in Europe did absolutely nothing to alter the statutes of colonial regimes—the Congo and Indonesia are glaring examples. The crucial levers of change were of a quite different kind. In the first place, the logic of a transformer imperialism, as has already been said (see Part I), is the creation of a consumer market in the imperial dependency. For

\*The prefix is, in a sense, arbitrary since it suggests only the ‘extremist’ element in the system. But the term is convenient to use here, as it has wide currency among the Angolan nationalists.

this, a minimum monetary income for the African population is necessary. At the same time, increasing capitalization and improved technology effect a massive rationalization of the whole mode of exploitation of the colony's resources. Profits and productivity soar. But the indispensable complement of an advanced technology is a sophisticated work-force. The more complex a machine process, the more skilled—and fit—the operative must be. No advanced industrial process can be run on malnutrition and illiteracy. At this point, the whole *style* of the imperialism changes: terror gives way to paternalism. The Union Minière regime in Katanga, with its capital-intensive techniques and extensive welfare policies, is the only developed example of this type of imperial control in Africa. But it is the logic of any industrializing colonialism—except in cases where there is a considerable white labour force, when the African proletariat can be permanently held at a low level of skills. The one major apparent exception in fact significantly confirms the rule. South Africa—the most industrialized single area in the continent—still makes extensive use of what is tantamount to forced labour: Africans are confined to reserves which cannot support them at even subsistence level, and are only allowed out on signature of a contract for the gold mines, for which there is a monopoly recruiting agency. However, it is precisely the economic *irrationality* of the South African gold industry which makes this necessary. Rand ore is of such low grade and by now lies so deep that in normal conditions its extraction would be nowhere near economically viable: about 160,000 tons of ore have to be processed to wring out a ton of gold. Mines with richer and more accessible deposits than this have simply been abandoned in Australia or the USA, where the labour force has some collective bargaining power. There is only one reason why in these circumstances South Africa can maintain the largest gold industry in the world: an enormous apparatus of terror, which ensures a subsistence work force. Even so, a vast influx of migrant labour (about 200,000 in all) from the far less developed surrounding territories is necessary as a supplement to the flow from the reserves. In this sense South Africa is a (relatively) industrialized peninsula relying on a huge underdeveloped hinterland to preserve an anachronistic economy. The exception it apparently poses in fact strikingly confirms the rule that economically rationalised colonial exploitation tends towards paternalism.

Portuguese use of forced labour can now be seen in context. It is the ramshackle instrument of a colonial power which has never been able to realise a transformer relation to its dependencies or even to its own economy. Portugal has never had the resources to export serious amounts of fixed capital to its colonies: there has never been a real technological investment of the colonial terrain. And so economic development has never reached a point where incentives can come into play. Hence the mass use of forced labour. In a situation where the exchange economy is itself so primitive that it holds no attractive power for the peasant, undisguised coercion must be used to smash the subsistence sector. Hence the “shibalo” system and its attendant

devices: first, “vagrancy” clauses, then the classic head-tax to force the peasant into the monetary sector. As in South Africa, whole areas of economic activity are fundamentally irrational, and are only sustained and made profitable by the use of forced labour: the whole cotton industry of Northern Mozambique, the colony’s main export crop, is a precarious creation in a basically unsuitable climatic and pedological environment. More than this, the whole use of forced labour itself incarnates the irrationality of the economic system at large—the very irrationality which, in a pure vicious circle, is responsible for its existence in the first place. Forced labour is an attempted solution to the problem of labour shortage. In Angola, at least, this would have existed even for an industrially-equipped colonialism, because of the ravages of the slave-trade, which had depopulated the area of some four million people by the time it came to an end. However, Portuguese forced labour, designed to solve a shortage of labour, inevitably ends by intensifying it. The work regime imposed on the Africans is so oppressive that a massive and continual exodus from the colonies is provoked, thus aggravating the “demographic anaemia” which was partly responsible for the process in the first place.

The logical conclusion of the whole system is the acceptance and even encouragement of the phenomenon under official auspices, amounting to its conversion from emigration to administratively organized export. As in the 17th century, the economy is left unchanged and even weakened, for the sake of the receipts brought in by the export of labour. “Without gold there is no South Africa, and without Mozambique there is no gold,” would almost be a fitting reformulation of the old adage.\* By an astonishing anachronism, Mozambique’s relation to the South African economy of today is in many ways almost a facsimile of Angola’s relation to the Brazilian economy three centuries ago.

Forced labour, then, is the crux of the Portuguese colonial system, the phenomenon which most immediately and unerringly reveals its specific nature, its twin hallmarks of extremism and archaism. It can now be seen how the other dimensions of Portuguese colonialism conform to the pattern which it sets.

## II. Settlement

The efficient exploitation of a colony obviously demands not only available and utilizable African labour, but effective white presence and control. A second major index of the character of Portuguese colonialism is the extent and type of its colonization.

It has been seen now up to the last decade of the 19th century, Portuguese settlements in Africa were small and stagnant: at the turn of the 1870’s there were probably altogether about 3,000 Portuguese south of the Equator. Significantly, the first considerable contingent of settlers to any Portuguese African colony in the classic period of imperial seizure were not Portuguese at all. They were

\*“Without sugar there is no Brazil and without Angola there is no sugar”. See Part I. NLR 15.

Boers, the "Thirstland Trekkers", a group which left the Mafeking area in 1875 to escape British control, and trekked north through Bechuanaland and South West Africa, reaching Portuguese territory in 1880. There were 300 survivors of this journey (600 had started out), "the largest band of settlers seen in Angola up to that time." It will be remembered that the whole white population of Angola had been calculated at only 1,000 twenty-five years before, by Livingstone.

The Boer settlement at Humpata provoked the Lisbon government to make great efforts to counter this foreign initiative. "Impoverished, generally ignorant families were recruited in all parts of the metropolis to be sent off at the government's expense to southern Angola to insulate the Boer community."\* This *dirigiste* and administratively financed colonization set an important precedent. Its immediate outcome was not very successful, however. Average Portuguese emigration to Africa was about 400 persons a year for the 1850's through to the 1890's. In the 1890's it rose to about 1,500-2,000 a year. About 1900 the government abandoned the emigration policy. At that date, the Portuguese population of Angola stood at about 9,000, the bulk of whom were military and administrative personnel. The figure was probably much the same for Mozambique.

The early years of the 20th century showed a slow improvement. By about 1930, the white and mestiço populations of Angola and Mozambique were:

		Angola (1927)	Mozambique (1928)
White	... ..}	42,843	17,800
Mestiço	... ..}		8,350
		42,843	26,150
Total population...	...	3,000,000	3,500,000

Government sponsored colonization schemes continued all this time, but were markedly less successful in consolidating Portuguese presence than the unsponsored inflow of bureaucratic and entrepreneurial personnel. However, overall emigration figures began to show a major increase from the 1940's onwards, and in the last ten years the flow has become wide and rapid, particularly to Angola:

	1940	1950	1960
Angola ... ..	44,000	79,000	200,000
Mozambique ... ..	27,500	48,000	80,000

Assuming that climatic conditions are the main single determinant of white settlement, Portuguese colonization now compares adequately with other areas where the relative effort involved in white adaptation is similar. The *altiplano* of Angola—the Bié and Huila plateaux—lies some 3,000 to 5,000 feet above sea-level, well above malarial and sufficiently above tsetse zones, has an annual mean temperature centring on 18° to 20°, and a rainfall of some 1,000 mm. Mozambique is much less favoured: in the main it lies much lower (1 to 1,000 feet), its humidity is much greater, and the general

\*Duffy, op. cit.

climatic type is closer to tropical Africa. A comparison with other central and southern African territories confirms that settler density in both colonies is relatively heavy:

*Selected Central and Southern African Territories*  
*Ratio of White to African Population*

South Africa	...	1 : 3	Bechuanaland	...	1 : 77
S.W. Africa	...	1 : 6	Congo	...	1 : 130
Angola	...	1 : 20	Nyasaland	...	1 : 280
N. Rhodesia	...	1 : 30	Tanganyika	...	1 : 450
Kenya	...	1 : 70	Ruanda-Urundi	...	1 : 600
Mozambique	...	1 : 75	Uganda	...	1 : 640

At first sight then, Portuguese colonization appears to have been normal and effective. However, the extent of this immigration in itself conveys almost nothing of its *type*. For various considerations indicate that, despite its volume, Portuguese colonization of the African territories is not by any means necessarily similar in kind, and thus in significance, to white immigration elsewhere in southern and central Africa.

Emigration is a classically ambiguous phenomenon. It may indicate exactly opposite extremes of social tonus: superabundance and dynamism, or stagnation and anaemia. Its meaning clearly depends on whether it is the *only* alternative in an utterly untenable situation or a *maximum* alternative in a situation which allows several viable options. In the first case it is flight, in the other conquest—normally, of course, it is a mixture of the two. The relative weight of each element, however, is usually clear enough. Irish emigration, in the second half of the 19th century ran to an overall average of 59,000 a year, from a population of about 4½ million between 1861 and 1921, a period punctuated by repeated famine. In the same period, English emigration averaged around 35,000, from a population which rose from 28 million to 44 million, during which time real wages rose well over 100 per cent. The disproportion in scale only emphasises the dissimilarity in cause.

In this perspective, Portuguese colonial emigration emerges in a clearly different light from, say, British and South African emigration to Southern Rhodesia (the latter in particular representing an almost pure case of “maximum emigration”), which has been running at a comparable level in the last decade. Between 1939 and 1958, metropolitan real wages dropped by one-third in Portugal. In the same period, the average wage of the British industrial worker rose by two-thirds. The character of the two immigrations is thus sharply distinct. The difference is underlined by a second aspect of Portuguese colonization which sets it off from all other white settlements in Africa.

This is the existence of large-scale unemployment in the European population itself. Few official figures of any kind are released on this, but the phenomenon is attested to by virtually all competent observers recently in the colonies. It is particularly acute in Angola. The correspondent of “Le Monde” in Angola in early 1960 reported that there were 20,000 white unemployed in the country (official esti-

mates gave 7,000). An "Observer" correspondent in 1961 estimated a figure of 10,000 for Luanda alone (the total white population of Luanda is probably about 50,000). White unemployment on this scale is unique in Africa. All the possible explanations for it once again indicate a basic discrepancy between Portuguese and "normal" imperialism. On the one hand, white unemployment in the colonies might be interpreted as an extreme symptom of the "fugitive" emigration already discussed: the centrifugal pressures of the metropolitan situation may be so strong as to overwhelm all economic rationality, driving its victims blindly from one situation of unemployment or underemployment on to another. At the same time, the phenomenon suggests that the level of capitalization of the colonial terrain is still very low, producing only limited job opportunities within a simple and rigid employment structure. A final consideration is complementary: the degree of cultural accumulation. A low level of equipment almost certainly correlates to a lack of skills. The Portuguese unemployed in the colonial cities may well be unemployable at any level higher than the unskilled manual labour to which the African is relegated, and which in the colonial situation is unthinkable for the European. Caught between an impossible metropolitan situation, an incomplete colonial economy and an African proletariat, the poor Portuguese immigrant helplessly swells the ranks of a lumpenproletariat characterised by the most virulent of racialisms.

The peculiar character of the Portuguese colonial immigrant is highlighted by the official colonization schemes, which form an appropriate conclusion to any account of white settlement in Portuguese Africa. In Angola and Mozambique a number of wholly administratively-created settlement projects have been set in motion. These colonization schemes are systematized and planned down to the minutest detail by the Lisbon government, which defrays their cost from the Colonial Development Plan. In post-war African colonial history, there is no parallel to them: the nearest point of comparison are the Italian settlement programmes in Libya and Ethiopia in the 1920's and 30's. The projects amount to the administrative transplantation of entire peasant communities from the home country to the colony, and the reconstruction there of a habitat as nearly as possible identical, down to the smallest detail, with the village they have left behind. In the model area of Cela on the Huila plateau in Angola, some 375 families or 2,000 persons have since 1953 been brought in to form a total of around 12,000 cultivable acres—an average holding of 30 acres per family; in addition each family is given about 100 acres of grazing land. At Guiga in Mozambique some 4,500 to 5,000 families have been settled in the Limpopo valley and given  $2\frac{1}{2}$  acres of irrigated land per working person, up to a total of 10 acres per family, and some 60 acres each of non-irrigated land for grazing purposes. The colonists are provided with houses, gardens, orchards, livestock, seed and agricultural implements. At Cela the first village was called after Salazar's

birthplace—Vimiero. All African labour is officially forbidden on these meticulous recreations of rural Portugal. The slogan which inspires them runs: “To each man his hoe”.

These extraordinary creations reveal more vividly than anything else the peculiarities of Portuguese colonization in Africa in the 20th century. The normal process of colonialism in an underdeveloped country involves the transformation of an indigenous subsistence peasantry into a dispossessed rural or urban proletariat, contained within an articulated economic complex manned at all points of control by whites of various levels of skills. But Portugal has never had either the capital equipment to install, or the skilled manpower to staff, such a complex. Hence it has resorted to the almost incredible device of creating alongside, or rather in place of, the African peasantry, a colonial European peasantry. The eviction of the one by the other involves almost no agronomic advance at all: it merely relieves population pressure in the home country. Once again, the pattern of ultra-colonialism asserts itself: a surplus which cannot be extracted by technological investment is wrung by main force. Or rather an attempt is made to wring it. All the indications are that the colonization schemes, epitomes of the contradictions of a pre-industrial colonialism, are a massive financial waste. The cost of these expatriate villages is astronomic: the “Times” correspondent who visited the Cela settlement in mid-1960 reported that the average cost of settlement was £2,500 a person, if the administrative and service personnel supported by the villages (about 1,500 persons) was included, and was about £4,500 for each actual member of the farming community, whether economically active or not. The same correspondent, commenting on the Portuguese community in Angola as a whole, added: “The whites, who number about 170,000 are mostly peasants little more skilled than the 4,200,000 Africans in the country.” The farming he judged to be of a very low standard indeed, so low that families were drifting off the land to swell the urban employed, while those who remained inevitably began—despite official prohibitions—to exploit native labour: “Administrators there are turning a blind eye to the employment of Africans by Portuguese farmers.”

The colonization schemes, attempting to transplant the Portuguese countryside physically to Africa, are obviously of ideological inspiration. Their place in the system of Portuguese imperial mystique will be examined in a later section. For the moment the relevant point is that the form this bureaucratic initiative has taken is once again a manifest expression of the root debility of Portuguese colonialism. The phenomena of white unemployment and a white peasantry are in full logical continuity with the phenomenon of black forced labour.

### **III. Missions**

All the European powers, even the most dechristianized, have sponsored massive and continuous Christian missionary activity in their colonies. The reason is easy to see. The conversion of the native population represents, even if only symbolically, its incorporation

into the mental and cultural universe of the white. It thus has the value, even to the most atheist and anti-clerical colonial administration, of initiating the process of disciplinary adaptation to European cultural norms. Besides this objective significance, conversion also has an important psychological function within the white community itself. Confronted with the frightening, fathomless alterity of the African population, its opaque and menacing presence outside the familiar, regulated universe of white society, an immense fear often seizes the settler. He suddenly experiences the vast, protective vault of European culture as incomplete, and trembles at the darkness beyond.<sup>1</sup> In a situation of extreme insecurity organised religion, intent on converting the African, reassures. Christianity in colonial areas is a *domestication* of the indigenous population: objectively, it breaks the African in to European thought and mores, subjectively, it frees the European of his terrors of the African by including him within the same canon as himself. At the same time, it has a crucial additional merit for any colonizer. It represents an ideal *arrested threshold* of acculturation for the native. A colonial system needs a subject population with a certain minimal level of europeanization, for the purposes of order and exploitation. On the other hand, too great an assimilation of European culture and techniques would directly threaten the inequality on which the entire colonial order rests. The Christian religion offers almost the perfect device for securing the fruits of the first, without incurring the dangers of the second. Religion is at once the *least utilisable* but the most *formally resumptive* single sector of European culture. It is also one of the most simplifiable. Hence its unique value as an instrument of rigorously limited and controlled acculturation. The native acquires enough elements of white culture to be disciplined and obedient, but not enough to become competent and initiating.<sup>2</sup> By exposing the African to what is formally a central, but in fact a peripheral and profoundly inefficacious area of white culture, colonialism is able to secure the precarious miracle of the "arrested threshold". For how long, will be examined later.

<sup>1</sup>This is no literary fancy. As stolid a witness as Margery Perham confesses: "Many years ago, when waiting in Aden for a ship to take me across to Somaliland, then still a pretty wild place, I suddenly had a feeling that I could not leave the relative civilization of Aden and plunge into that unknown land across the sea. It was not ordinary physical fear, certainly not sexual fear. It was the fear that myself, this white, English, self-loved, cultivated self, would in some way be lost, overwhelmed . . . among tens of thousands of other beings, not necessarily inferior but utterly alien and uncomprehending. The nightmare feeling passed . . ." Reith Lecture IV, 1961.

<sup>2</sup>For a poignant example of awareness by an indigenous population of this function of conversion, see Peter Worsley, *The Trumpet Shall Sound*, London, 1957. He quotes an anthropologist: 'The education given by the Mission is largely an adjunct of its primary aim to secure converts to the Christian faith . . . the instruction received aims little higher than a sufficient literacy to increase the pupils understanding of the Scriptures', and adds: "Melanesians became so convinced that real education was being withheld from them that they placed special emphasis in their cult-programmes upon obtaining the 'Secret' which the White man was concealing. This Secret was sometimes declared to be the first page of the Bibles they gave the islanders . . ."

The same profoundly expressive myth of the incomplete Bible was current in the Kimbanguist movement in the Congo. Cf. Andersson, *Messianic Movements in the Lower Congo*, Uppsala, 1952.

## Portugal and the End of Ultra-Colonialism

Portuguese missionary activity in Africa began at the very opening of European penetration, in the 15th century. In a unique episode, an attempt was made to Christianize a major African people, the Bakongo, by treating on apparently equal terms with its ruler, and converting him to the faith. In 1491, the supreme Bakongo ruler was baptized and became King João: his son Afonso succeeded him about 1505 and ruled the Congo basin for over 30 years as a Christian monarch. Christianization, however, remained limited to Court circles; Portuguese colonists rapidly dominated royal policy; and the slave trade began its ravages. Under these conditions, it was not long before Christian influence disappeared. The white population died, fled or was absorbed. The Congo chiefs became more and more despotic and the unity of the kingdom crumbled. São Salvador, the Bakongo capital, was a deserted city in 1690, its 12 churches, its walls and fortresses in ruins.

Farther south, in Angola proper, missionary activity was for a long period dominated, significantly, by non-Portuguese: Italian Capuchins. From about 1650 to 1750 or later some 400 friars laboured to convert the African population in the hinterland behind Luanda. Their efforts were wholly ephemeral, but the scale and energy of their attempt compares dramatically with the specifically Portuguese Catholic programme. When the Capuchins had gone, religious activity in Angola rapidly came to a standstill. By 1850 there were only five priests in all Angola. In desperation, the Portuguese government appealed to the Capuchins to return, only to meet with refusal. Finally, another foreign clerical organisation, this time the French fathers of the Saint Esprit, had to be called in by the Vatican. In the second half of the 19th century these fathers penetrated southern Angola, establishing missions and seminaries there.

In Mozambique, missionary activity was carried on mainly by Portuguese Dominicans. Despite intensive campaigns, proselytisation was, as always when unsupported by a coherent military and economic machine, wholly ineffective and ephemeral. In 1825 there were just ten priests in the whole colony, and of these seven were Goans. By the middle of the century “in some years there was not a single missionary in the interior and only three or four along the coast.”\* The situation improved towards the end of the century, but this period also brought an influx of foreign missionaries—German friars, French Montfort and Salesian fathers, Italian Consolate friars.

The Salazar régime, under the official rubric of “Faith, Family, Toil”, is intensely and avowedly Catholic. It has already been seen how Catholicism plays an absolutely pivotal role in the ideological and power-political structure of the regime (see Part 1). It may be added that Portugal is usually considered the single most saturatedly Catholic country in Europe. In these circumstances it is not surprising that the official religion of the home country receives State blessing overseas. Article 140 of the Portuguese Constitution states: “Portuguese Catholic missions overseas and those establishments preparing personnel for that service—shall be protected and aided

\*Duffy, *op. cit.*

by the State as institutions of instruction and assistance and instruments of civilisation.” With a totally and reportedly devoutly Catholic home country, an authoritarian and “nationalist” political régime, and official backing for Catholic and national proselytization, all the conditions for massive conversion in this century seem to be united. In these circumstances one would expect a particularly complete and impressive absorption of the African population into the fold of the Church.

The published figures for christianization are almost certainly overcalculated, but they alone are a shock in view of the conditions just outlined. According to the 1950 census they run as follows:

	<i>Catholic</i>	<i>Protestant</i>
Angola . . . . .	1,500,000	540,000
Mozambique . . . . .	210,000	60,000

In each case, a third of the Christian community is heretical, despite the non-existence of any Protestant minority in Portugal whatsoever.

The Protestant missionaries are, of course, foreigners: the main denominations represented are the British Baptists, the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, the United Church of Canada, the American Methodist Episcopal Church, and the Brethren. However, even the figures above conceal more than they reveal. If one looks at the number of priests from each confession in the colonies, the comparison is even more startling:

	<i>Angola (1957)</i>	<i>Mozambique (1957)</i>
Catholic . . . . .	387	310
Protestant . . . . .	300	200

It is clear from this that Protestant ministry to the converted is probably far more thorough and continuous than is the case in the Catholic community: the links between clergy and laity are thus almost certainly much closer. This impression is confirmed by data on the contribution of the Protestant missions to such African education as exists in the Portuguese colonies. In a situation where secondary education is almost unknown, the impact of these missions on primary and “rudimentary” (i.e. sub-primary) schooling is, at least in Angola, of some importance:

<i>Angola 1954</i>			
<i>Primary Schools</i>	<i>Schools</i>	<i>Teachers</i>	<i>Students</i>
Government . . .	139	293	10,979
Catholic . . . . .	24	} 280	6,454
Protestant . . . . .	42		
Private . . . . .	132		

Again, the figures are probably deceptive. The quality of instruction in the Protestant schools appears to be markedly higher than in their Catholic counterparts—so much so, that a quasi-elite of Protestant-educated Africans seems to have been created. When the war of national liberation broke out in early 1961, Portuguese repression struck with special and conscious ruthlessness against this group,

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suspected of providing the leadership for the revolution. Both Roberto and Pinnock, leaders of the UPA, were educated in British Baptist missionary schools in the Congo province of Angola.

Once again, the contradictions of Portuguese colonialism are evident. The mostly intensely and bigotedly Catholic colonial power has been powerless to prevent the usurpation of Catholic spiritual authority over a large proportion of the colonial population. The placid process of christianization has been changed into a stealthy instigation of disaffection. For in as officially and explicitly a Catholic milieu as the Salazarist Portuguese colonies, Protestantism assumes an explosive potential far beyond its normal significance. It is a breach in a system which anywhere in the world offers itself as total and exclusive, but which in Angola or Mozambique, as in Portugal itself, carries in addition the official imprimatur of the state.

It has been seen how, in the absence of a developed political ideology, Catholicism plays an absolutely crucial role in the maintenance of the Salazarist regime. When a regime ties itself as tightly to the Church as this, the political consequences of allowing unorthodox religion to gain ground in the subject population are bound in the long run to be disastrous. The more acute Portuguese settlers have seen this clearly enough: the "arrested threshold" is not easy to maintain even in areas where there is denominational unity between the colonial administration and the missions. Individual missionaries are not always impervious to the nature of colonial rule, while their doctrine can have certain obvious latent dangers for the administration in its impact on African consciousness. More important, the process of education itself has its own momentum, and cannot always be arbitrarily halted. But in the Portuguese colonies, the contradiction between a Catholic colonialism and Protestant christianization has in certain key areas—notably the Bakongo-populated provinces of N. Angola—overthrown the device altogether, and in doing so seriously weakened the whole structure of colonial authority there.

The paradox of a self-emblazoned Catholic power unable to effect competent proselytization of its own colonial population, and yielding ground to Protestant missionary activism, is striking. Only in East Africa—Uganda and Tanganyika—has anything comparable occurred. In these territories, the Catholic population now outnumbers the Protestant, despite a hitherto Protestant administration. However, two major differences between British and Portuguese colonialism make this less surprising than the situation in Angola and Mozambique. In the first place, the British administration has never had anything like such an intimate or pivotal relationship with the Church of England as the Portuguese government has with the Catholic church. The official status of the Church of England is in comparison a purely paper affair. In the second place, Britain as a metropolitan country has a relatively small, but active and influential Catholic minority, whereas Portuguese Protestantism is unknown. Given these differences, the anomaly of sizeable Protestant populations in the Portuguese colonies remains. At the same time, the

phenomenon is in keeping with the general contours of Portuguese colonialism as they have emerged so far. Missionary activism is a symptom of a wider élan; from the time when da Gama at the dawn of European imperialism said “I seek Christians and spices,” it has always been one dimension of the total colonial enterprise, and as such suggestive of all the others.

Portugal’s impotence to ensure uniform Catholicism is the same impotence as its inability to build an incentive-driven colonial economy, or to provide an appropriate settler influx. But in this case the outcome—foreign substitution—is different, and portentous. The precedent it sets will be repeated elsewhere.

#### **IV. Ideology: Theory and Practice**

“The Overseas Territories of Portugal are given the generic name ‘provinces’ . . . they are an integral part of the Portuguese State.” (Articles 134 and 135 of the Constitution). Officially, Guinea, Timor or Mozambique are Portuguese provinces, identical in nature and statute to Tras-Os-Montes or Alentejo; common areas of a single, indivisible national community. “In the Portuguese view there are no colonial territories subject to the metropolitan community; there is a single national community covering a territory which is juridically one despite geographical separation”.\* But if all the geographical units comprising this multi-continental Portugal have the same status, their inhabitants do not. The special statute governing the mainland African “provinces” is the Decree-Law No. 39.666. According to its provisions, *indígenas* (natives) are “persons of Negro race or their descendants . . . who do not yet have the education and the individual and social customs necessary for the complete enforcement of the private and public law applicable to Portuguese citizens.” The system of law applicable to those defined in this way, the “*indigenato*” is sweeping. Article 23 of the Decree-Law excludes all natives from any rights vis-a-vis non-native political institutions (i.e. the caricature of voting and common rights possessed by the white population). Article 9 restricts freedom of movement. Article 32 states that work is an indispensable element for the native’s progress and permits administrative enforcement of it. Article 26 specifies that obligatory labour can be enforced for fiscal default.

Africans everywhere may be born “native”, but “assimilation” can set them free. Assimilation is the means whereby the “uncivilised” (i.e. native) can join the ranks of the officially classified “civilised”. The criteria of civilisation are the following: ability to speak Portuguese; income sufficient to support the candidate and his family; good character and possession of “those qualities necessary for the exercise of the private and public rights of the Portuguese citizen”; non-evasion of military service; and at least eighteen years of age. Any African who has passed these tests can enjoy the severely limited rights of the White Portuguese. The presence of criteria such as

\*Quotations in this section are drawn mainly from: Salazar, ‘Doctrine And Action’, London, 1939; James Duffy, ‘Portuguese Africa’, Harvard, 1959; ‘Inquiry on Anti-Colonialism’, Lisbon, 1957.

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“good character” make it clear that, in any given case, assimilation depends on the colonial administration’s good pleasure. More fundamental, however, in determining the content of the formal theory of assimilation, is the educational level at which the African population is maintained. The number of those receiving education of any sort in the two major colonies of Portuguese Africa was in 1956 as follows:

	<b>Angola</b>	<b>Mozambique</b>
Total population . . . . .	4,200,000	6,000,000
Number in school . . . . .	85,000	284,000

These figures include the white population as well. Even after the necessary deductions for this, the extent of the education available for Africans is still not adequately conveyed. In 1954, there were 183,092 pupils in Mozambique “rudimentary” schools (reserved almost exclusively for Africans). Of these, just 3,595 took the final examination (after three years) allowing the pupil to continue his education at third-year level in a primary school. Of these 2,774 passed. In 1955 there were 212,428 pupils in Catholic rudimentary schools; of these exactly 2,761 were able to continue their education in primary school. In Angola in 1954, there were 25,361 pupils in rudimentary schools, while 1,712 took the final examination, and 959 passed. The numbers dwindle still further in secondary education. In 1954 in all Mozambique there were 120 Africans in commercial, industrial or normal secondary schools; in Angola there were 141. In the elite Liceu, the preparatory school for university level, there were 5 Africans and 800 white students; no African has ever completed the whole Liceu course. Higher education is more or less entirely inaccessible; virtually the only Africans from the Portuguese colonies who have had higher education have acquired it in extra-Portuguese universities. The outcome is that 99% of the African population is officially reckoned to be illiterate (1950 census). Unsurprisingly, then, the number of the assimilated is negligible:

<b>African Population</b>	<b>Angola</b>	<b>Mozambique</b>	<b>Guinea</b>
“Uncivilised” . . . . .	4,000,598	5,646,957	502,457
“Civilised” . . . . .	30,089	25,149	1,498
Percentage . . . . .	0.74%	0.44%	0.29%

Even these figures exaggerate. Since the wives and children of assimilados can claim assimilation semi-automatically, without meeting the educational requirements or being in a position to exercise even the limited rights of the status in any real sense, a truer estimate of the number of African assimilados would be about 10,000 for Angola (0.24%), 8,000 for Mozambique (0.13%) and some 500 or so for Guinea (0.1%). This order of calculation is corroborated by the fact that 15,338, over half, of African assimilados were illiterate at the last count.

Integral to the whole theory of the “overseas provinces” and “assimilation” is the claim that in Portuguese Africa there is no

practice of racial discrimination in any sense. The distinctions between native and non-native are proclaimed to be cultural, not racial; the proof is the device of assimilation, by which the African, in passing certain purely cultural tests, is thereafter treated on an exactly equal footing with his white “compatriot”. The very conception of a polyethnic Portugal extending across oceans and continents in a single, indivisible unity is announced as the polar opposite of apartheid theories of racialism.

The reality brutally and publicly negates this mythology. In the realm of theory, the very definition of a “native” is explicitly and unambiguously racialist: “persons of Negro race or their descendants”. No white settler has to prove that he is of “good character” or has employment, to qualify for citizenship. In fact, white unemployment is as has been seen—widespread. If cultural indices were really to be invoked, the outcome would be embarrassing for the white population: a quarter of it is illiterate. Economically, the disparity between white and African wage-scales matches the most virulent patterns of apartheid.

As for social practice, discrimination of the most flagrant and classic kind is attested by all observers. Hospitals have black and white wards; restaurants announce “Admission reserved”; hotels have all-white staffs. A bus-ride in Lourenço-Marques costs a quarter of an African daily wage; a cinema ticket more than a day’s wage. White commercial, social and entertainment centres are sealed off by their price-levels. Rents impose separate white and African townships.

In Lourenço-Marques, there is a permanent curfew for Africans after nine o’clock in the evening: the image of alien military occupation itself. In both Angola and Mozambique the “cadernata” which must be held by all natives operates as a passbook: permission must be granted by the administration for the holder to move from one area to another. In principle and in practice, the system of control is thus almost exactly the same as in South Africa.

Finally, an insistent theme of Portuguese colonial ideology is the celebration of mixed unions between black and white, as the distinctive and decisive pattern of Portuguese presence in Africa. The example of Brazil is much invoked as evidence of the unique colour-tolerance of the Lusitanian character. Miscegenation is officially hailed as the benign consummation of Portuguese panracialism. “The Portuguese, led by healthy instinct, mixed with the various populations of the world and contributed highly to racial fusion. It was from the free exercise of this impulse, that leads him to consider men as his equals and makes him love women of all colours, that was born the great Brazilian nation which surprises the world by unique harmony of human living. A similar miracle occurs in some overseas provinces and is on the verge of taking place in others . . .”

What is the extent of the “miracle” in Portuguese Africa? According to the 1950 census, there were 25,000 *mestiços* in Angola, and the same number in Mozambique. The real figure is probably somewhat higher, though not greatly so. The official *mestiço* popula-

tion is thus just 0.4% of the total population in Mozambique and 0.6% of the total population in Angola. The comparative proportion of the Coloured population in the Union of South Africa is 8.5%. Allowing for the much larger white settlement in South Africa, the ratio of mestiços to white population is:

Mozambique	...	...	1 : 3
Angola	...	...	1 : 8
S. Africa	...	...	1 : 11

Anglo-Afrikaner colonialism legally prohibits miscegenation: Portuguese colonialism officially celebrates it. The practical outcome of the one is not very dissimilar from the other. The falsity of Portuguese claims of special "tolerance" is evident. The point is underlined when a historical perspective is introduced. In the middle of the nineteenth century, the mulatto population of Angola and Mozambique was probably about double the white population (6,000 to 3,000). In the late 1920's there were an estimated 25,000 mestiços in Angola: 30 years later the number is the same. It is obvious that mixed unions have become rarer and rarer down to the present day. The latest available statistics reveal damningly the extent of Portuguese inter-racialism:

**Angola 1958** (*civilised persons*)

<i>Men</i>	<i>Women</i>	<i>Number of Marriages</i>
White	White	154
White	Mulatto	20
Mulatto	White	4
Mulatto	Mulatto	23
Mulatto	Negro	3
Negro	Mulatto	1
Negro	Negro	20
Negro	White	1
		Total 226

In other words, there was exactly one marriage between a negro and a white in Angola. The overall situation is comparable, if not to South Africa, then to Mississippi or Alabama.

### **The Nature of the Theory**

Portuguese colonial ideology, like its counterparts elsewhere on the continent, is a systematic falsification of reality. As such, it is of little more interest than any other imperial mystique. However, it is at the same time, a highly *distinctive* ideology. As has been seen, while social and economic practice in Portuguese Africa and the Union is overwhelmingly similar, the theories which describe and justify it, formally denounce each other. If apartheid is the most extreme avowed racialism since Nazism, Portuguese colonial theory prides itself on its systematic repudiation and condemnation of all racialism. Uniquely, Salazar's colonial mystique primarily defines itself *in opposition* to all other colonialisms. Within the complex of Portuguese imperialism, what is the significance of this colonial

ideology which begins by attacking colonialism itself?

The legal and bureaucratic formulae quoted above give no adequate image of the style and rationale of Portuguese colonial ideology. For this, one must turn to the explicitly “philosophical” expositions of imperial policy.

The first principle of the ideology is, of course, the assertion of an absolute unity and identity between the constituent parts of a supra-continental Portugal. As early as 1933 Salazar proclaimed at the adoption of the new Colonial Statute: “To ourselves we constitute a diversity in unity, a common field of labour, the conditions of which are subject to the interests of all concerned. To other countries we are simply a unit, a single country—the same throughout.” Lower-echelon apologists allow themselves more exalted formulations: “Empire means Authority—and there is no Authority where Power is divided and diluted. It is the duty of the new State to re-establish the force of Power. With it will be revived all the power-concepts of the Past. One of these power-concepts was the unity of territory and of the grail, as though there were no seas or races separating the constituent elements of the National Whole.” The Portuguese citizen, in a mood of “constant national exaltation, of extensive and intensive moral vibrance” can contemplate the miracle of his pancontinental destiny: “Our sovereignty as a small European state spreads prodigiously over three continents and is summed up in the magnificent certainty that we are the third colonial power in the world.”

“One State, One Race, One Faith and One Civilization”—this primordial principle established, Salazar’s ideologists proceed to their second great theme: the spiritual supremacy of the Portuguese Empire. They invoke “the ancestral memory of an astonishing gallery of discoverers and builders, who, moved by a sacred impulse, carried to the ends of the world our ships, our dominion—and our faith”. Although passing homage is paid to the “foundation in remote lands of centres of production and profit . . . the poetry of Portuguese labour in far and hidden places”, it is emphasised that Portuguese imperialism, far from being a matter of economic exploitation, was one of spiritual donation—“a propulsive movement of religious doctrine that consciously wishes to unite humanity under the same banner of peace, justice and love”. In this movement of the Holy Church, Portugal’s role was prime. “It was on us, the Portuguese, that fell the prodigious job of fulfilling the most important part of this mission, that of cruising every sea and establishing contact with the majority of mankind.”

Salazar himself refers to “those inferior races whose inclusion under the influences of Christianity is one of the greatest and most daring achievements of Portuguese colonization.” But his spokesmen have been swift to correct the tome. The same ideas emerge transformed: “The Portuguese, like no other people, made their enterprises of exploration and conquest a transcendent campaign, a sharing of spiritual values”. The national “civilising mission” thus sets Portuguese expansion off from all others: “the action of the Portuguese

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cannot be confused with the movements of the capitalist colonising nations, which introduced a type of human relations based on racial segregation, in which the superior dominating race is contrasted with the inferior dominated race.” Free from the otherwise characteristic evils of “exploitation . . . oppression of a vanquished people . . . systematic devastation,” Portuguese colonialism is additionally blessed by the unique amiability of the national character: “The Portuguese do not need to affirm themselves by denying; on the contrary, led by a feeling of fraternity, they affirm themselves through love. The Portuguese man is, above all, profoundly humane and kind-hearted, without being weak . . .” It follows that “Portuguese expansion overseas has, therefore, a meaning of high transcendence in the history of mankind.” This meaning lies in its action of “universalization—the opening of contact and communication between all the inhabitants of the earth, and their unification within one religious communion. Starting out from a monogenetic point, human expansion had attained the maximum dispersion, pulverization and differentiation, and now moved to a monotheist ideal, it endeavours to return to its supreme unity.” In the words of the present Minister for the Overseas Provinces, Adreano Moreira, this is “missionary colonialism”: it is the “universalist mission which for centuries (Portuguese man) has been carrying on, and which can never be mistaken for colonisation put in terms of mere material interests and racial segregation.”

What is the significance of this bizarre cosmology? Its unreality is so blatant and complete that most observers have dismissed it with indignation or a shrug as the typical propaganda of a dictatorship. But to see it simply as this is to limit an understanding of the whole phenomenon of Portuguese colonialism. Its ideology is almost as revealing of Portuguese imperialism as its economy or demography. The function of the mythology is the classic one of justification and falsification. But its *meaning* exceeds its function, for it represents at the same time a response to *real* elements in historical experience. In both senses of the word, it “betrays” reality. No “missionary colonialism” has, of course, ever existed in humane contrast to “vital space colonialism”—the two have always been one. But in drawing distinctions like these, Portuguese apologists are expressing, in a way both mystified and mystifying, a sense of the singularity of Portuguese imperialism which is grounded in fact. As has been seen, Portuguese imperialism *is not* the classic capitalist imperialism. This is not because of moral advance, but because of economic and social retardation. Portuguese colonialism is a failure to achieve the normal imperial pattern, not an option which surpasses it. In the distorting mirror of ideology, the singularity dissolves and reforms in a shape that is transformed out of all recognition.

The denunciation of “profit” refracts a lack of capital: in an almost comparable way, the tolerance of “colour” obliquely reflects a shortage of women. Miscegenation is by no means a universal characteristic of Portuguese imperialism: it has played a considerable role in some areas and at some times (Brazil); and almost none in

others (contemporary Angola or Mozambique). “Colour bar” and discriminatory practices have similarly varied enormously with time and place, from relative mildness to the most savage ferocity.

However, when the myth of Portuguese lack of racialism has been exploded by historical evidence, the question remains: why has the segregationist Salazar regime tried to justify itself by invoking a non-existent “colour tolerance”, instead of say, as in South Africa, proclaiming and exulting in its racialism? Firstly, it is true that certain periods of Portuguese imperial history have been marked by fairly extensive miscegenation, more so than other selected national histories: this is, again, particularly true of Brazil. Secondly, it is clear that the universal pretensions of the Catholic Church have always *relatively* militated against open and systematic racialism, which would undermine the conversion potential of the Church. In contrast, most Protestant Churches are avowedly national and particularist (Dutch Reformed Church, Church of England, Church of Scotland, etc.), and so provide a much easier terrain for the untrammelled expression of racialism.

Catholicism, however, did not merely impede the development of an ideology of racialism in Portuguese Africa, it fortuitously prepared the bases for the present-day mystique of inter-racialism. For besides its universalism, the Church also has another relevant trait—sexual inegalitarianism. Portuguese soldiers and settlers were far less likely to take wives with them than their English or Dutch opposites. The Catholic wife, confined and cowed within the most menial domestic role, was a far cry from the iron-faced pioneering matron of the outback or the veldt. Colonial and “frontier” conditions of course increased Calvinist feminine autonomy—the first vote is granted to women in Utah, Wyoming, New Zealand, etc. The fate of the Catholic wife was a far cry from this. She was simply left at home. The figures for mid-19th century Portuguese Africa are telling: in the 1830’s, when there were reckoned to be some 1,832 whites in Angola, only 150 of these were women. As for the East Coast, travellers in Mozambique in the 19th century constantly comment on the scarcity of white women; the estimated population of Portuguese women in Lourenço Marques in 1887 was two.

In these conditions, settlers naturally took to African women, and miscegenation occurred on a considerable scale. Subsequent rationalisations have vested these unions with a “philosophical” significance which was entirely absent at the time: they were, in the words of the historian of Portuguese Africa, “erotic expediency”. The rationalisations have, significantly, only begun when the unions themselves have ceased to occur at all.

The materials for an a posteriori ideology were thus fortuitously supplied by the specific cultural patterns of early imperial Portugal—in particular its unswerving adherence to the Catholic Church and its quasi-mediaeval statute for women. Today, both of these factors are transformed: the role of religion has somewhat receded in the colonial territories, and wives now accompany white immigrants. Consequently, miscegenation and religious-racial integration have almost

disappeared: there are no longer mixed marriages, nor African prelates (the last Portuguese African bishop was ordained in the early 16th century). Their disappearance is the condition of the appearance of the ideology. It subsists on misinterpreted memories.

Portuguese colonial ideology, then, reflects real differences in colonial history, but distorts them out of recognition. The materials for the distortion are secondary and transitory aspects of the national imperialism. But the most revealing feature of the ideology lies in the unique way it assembles these materials to create its own image of Portuguese colonialism. As is evident, the whole style of Lisbon apologetics is quite unlike anything that any other colonial power has produced. It is uniquely ineffable and gratuitous. Most observers, however, have merely noticed the verbal debauch and limited their comment to that. But the style of language very clearly indicates a coherent and recognizable mode of thought. Portuguese colonial ideology is, more than any other, an exercise in pure magic. It is an immense effort to abolish concrete ethnic, linguistic, geographical, economic and social differences within a single, mystic unity. The means used to achieve this end is the classic instrument of magic: incantation. The subject, unable to effect any operations in the real world, renounces his effort and instead changes *himself*, by incantation. The verbal luxuriance is an end in itself. It is an *intoxication* to which the subject delivers himself: as the exaltation of the periods mounts, the world progressively dissolves and a new, entranced vision is formed. A swooning verbal profusion has substituted itself for reality. Within it, any logical operations are henceforth possible: the world becomes pure malleability.

This is the procedure of magic *par excellence*. More precisely, it is the procedure of a fundamentally pre-rational, pre-industrial mode of thought. The whole vocabulary, even the syntax of Portuguese colonialism, appears to predate Galileo. Even the colonial ideology, then, reveals the stamp of primitivism. At the same time, the extremism of these conceptions needs no stressing: they take the partial elements of "assimilation" which occur in many colonial ideologies ("Algérie Française," "Netherlands-Indonesia Union") to a principle of absolute identity. The fanaticism that can follow is clear. In its twin aspects, the mystique is a microcosm of the system as a whole.

A final remark remains to be made. It is striking that the Salazar regime, which has produced so little in the way of a systematic or distinctive philosophy at home, should have evolved an extensive and idiosyncratic ideology of Empire. The contrast reinforces a point suggested earlier: that the Empire, for Portugal, has for centuries been a central determinant and fulcrum of change within the metropolitan area itself. Today Portugal is in a position of economic dependence on its colonies. In this sense alone, one would expect the Empire to figure largely in official mystique. But there is another reason why this is so: it is the sole *raison d'être* of an otherwise entirely stagnant régime, which has failed to effect almost any transformation whatever in Portugal itself. It is the justification,

the compensation of 35 years of ignominy and neglect. Official spokesmen themselves make no secret of the importance of the Empire to them. Commander Sarmiento Rodrigues, then Minister for Colonies, announced to the Portuguese National Assembly in 1950: "Portugal is not a European continental nation, but a maritime and missionary power. The overseas expansion, started by the Portuguese 500 years ago, is the strongest reason for the existence of the nation." Marcelo Caetano, in the '30's, had put it even more bluntly: "Africa is more than a land to be exploited . . . Africa is for us a moral justification and a *raison d'être* as a power. Without it we would be a small nation; with it, we are a great country."

## V. "Covert Condominium"

It now only remains to give some idea of the role of foreign capital in the Portuguese Empire. The brief account which follows is not intended to be more than suggestive. There is no adequate factual material for a comprehensive study of foreign investment in Portugal and its Empire. As so often in this field no aggregate figures can be arrived at with any real degree of accuracy. Research is essentially reduced to enumeration. However, within limits, even this elementary method can point to relatively unambiguous conclusions. Thus perhaps the best way of introducing the subject is quite simply to list the major development projects initiated in either Portugal or her colonies in the last year before the Angolan war; that is, from January 1960 to May 1961.\* The panorama of foreign capital activity is impressive.

(i) **Montigo Steel Unit**—*Damag* (W. Germany): main contract A.E.I. and Babcock/Wilcox (Britain): Minor contract worth £0.5 millions.

(ii) **Matola Oil Refinery (Mozambique)**—*Procon* (Britain and USA).

(iii) **Dondo Aluminium Plant (Angola)**—*Péchiney* (France) to hold 40 per cent of capital, provide technical knowledge, etc. Cost is expected to be \$20 millions.

(iv) **Distribution network for gas, fuel oil and steam in the Seixal Steel Mill**—*Phoenix-Rheinruhr International* (Dusseldorf, W. Germany), *Contractora Moderna Ltd.*: Value of contract—17.3 million escudos.

(v) **Tagus Bridge Project**—*United States Steel Corporation* (USA), *Morrison—Company Inc.* (USA), *Tudor Engineering Company* (USA), *D. B. Steinman* (USA). The contract is worth 1,764 million escudos. Finances will come entirely from external credit to be provided by *Export-Import Bank* (USA) and *Seligman et Cie* of Paris.

(vi) **Seixal Steel Mill**—To be "semi-state owned" and operated through *Siderurgia Nacional*. The construction work is being performed by a consortium of German and Belgian firms. *Siderurgia*

\*Source: Economist Intelligence Unit *Economic Review of Portugal and her Provinces*, (Nos. 32–37).

Nacional has been authorised to increase its capital from 550 million to 750 million escudos.

**(vii) Titanium Pigment Factory (Sintes)**—*Sociedade Mineira Santa Fe, Fabrique de Produits Chimiques de Thann et de Mulhouse:* and *Saint Gobian Cie* (both France). The French companies are expected to supply over 300 million escudos for the project.

**(viii) Oporto Synthetic resins factory**—*Companhia Industrial de Resina Sintetica:* half of whose 20 million escudos capital is to be Japanese.

**(ix) Factory for manufacture of compressors/drills, etc.**—*Ingersoll Rand* (USA).

**(x) The Instituto Pasteur** (pharmaceuticals and retail chemists; formerly part of the CUF combine) has been bought up by the *Wyeth* concern (USA), which is linked to *American Home Products:* the price is approximately £300,000.

**(xi) Sociedade Industrial de Celulose (Socel)**—Has ordered a plant for manufacture of soda, and equipment for a new paper mill south of the Tagus. This will cost 28 million escudos and is to be supplied by a Swedish manufacturer.

**(xii) Uniao de Transportadores para Importação e Comercio Lda.**—has come to an agreement with *AEC* (Britain) for assembly and progressive manufacture of *AEC* buses and trucks in Portugal.

**(xiii) English Electric** established a local branch under the name of *English Electrica de Portugal:* this will secure the important agency arrangements of this combine in Portugal.

**(xiv) Angola Mining projects**—total value of development plans for expansion of manganese and iron ore production is approximately £16.2 million. Companies concerned are *Companhia Mineira de Lobito, Lagos o Irmao, Krupps* of Essen and *Hojgaard* and *Schultz* (Denmark). These last two firms have secured a government contract worth over £8 million for the railway equipment and other transportation for the scheme.

**(xv) Constancia pulp mill**—Equipment and engineering supplied by three British firms: *A.E.I., Babcock & Wilcox* and *Boving and Co.*

Foreign capital, in the classic form of the concessionary monopoly, was represented in the colonies from the late nineteenth century onwards. The government granted concessions to companies financed on foreign bourses, backed by foreign banks, and run by foreign managers. It has persisted in this form of economic exploitation down to this day, despite growing requests from Portuguese businessmen that the government should itself underwrite the costs

and risks of capitalization to limit the power of foreigners. Thus vast areas of, in particular, the Angolan economy, have been made over to foreign concerns. Even the most rapid survey makes this clear.

The most recently published export figures for Angola (Jan.-Nov. 1960) run as follows—with corresponding 1959 figures in brackets:

Coffee	1.116 million escudos	(1.125 million escudos)
Sisal	332 " "	( 252 " " )
Maize	149 " "	(1.125 " " )
Cotton	124 " "	( 74 " " )
Diamonds	484 " "	( 548 " " )
Iron Ore	136 " "	( 75 " " )

Thus it is from industrial crops, and in the first instance coffee, that the Angolan economy derives most of its wealth. Some 90 per cent of the production of coffee, sisal and maize is exported. The conventional picture presents this sector as Portuguese-controlled—either through the concessionary companies like the Companhia Agricole de Angola (CADA) which controls over 80 per cent of the coffee production, or directly by Portuguese settlers established on their estate-farms, *fazendas*. The reality is more complex. CADA, with a declared capital of \$7.775.000 (1958), showed profits of \$1,441,195 in the same year: its majority shareholder is the French Banque Rallet et Cie, which is also the prime holder in the minor agricultural companies, the Companhia Agricola do Cazengo and the Companhia Angolana de Agricultura. Cotton is entirely cultivated by Africans, who sell at fixed prices to the monopoly companies, which then pass on a cut to the administration. The major companies are the Société Générale de Belgique (represented by the Companhia Geral dos Algodões), the Banque Belge d’Afrique, the Compagnie Cottonière Congolaise, the Luinha-Société Agricole et Industrielle (this firm also controls Angola’s growing palm oil industry). Maize, similarly produced by Africans, passes through a series of Portuguese middlemen before being marketed. But here too, it is commercial companies like the Luinha-Société and CADA who are finally interested. In the various agricultural produce divisions then, non-Portuguese banks and firms often turn out to be the largest block shareholders, even when aggregate majorities are still Portuguese.

But it is mining and industry that pre-eminently form the preserve of the capital-intensive and sophisticated foreign concerns. The following table shows industrial production Jan.-June 1959/60:

#### Industrial Production (metric tons)

		1959	1960
Mining:	Copper ...	9,940	9,580
	Diamonds ...	493,680	493,300 (carat)
	Iron ore ...	136,310	326,250
	Manganese ...	18,420	11,740

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Food, etc.:	Sugar	...	7,750	16,330
	Alcohol	...	8,620	10,240 (hectolitres)
	Beer	...	39,220	38,390 ( " )
Other:	Cement	...	70,960	75,830
	Tobacco	...	490	540
	Textiles	...	1,800	1,470 (°000 metres)

Taking these sectors in turn, there is ubiquitous evidence of non-Portuguese participation:

### Mining Contracts with Government Operative 1.1.1953—

<i>Firm</i>	<i>Contract dates legislative acts</i>	<i>Reserve</i>	<i>Area</i>
Companhia de Diamantes de Angola (Diamang).	1921/22 1937	Prospecting and extraction of diamonds.	1,025,700 sq. km
Cia des Betuminosos de Angola.	1944 1950	Asphalts, bituminous coals.	31,130 sq. km behind Luanda and 5,790 sq. km behind Amboim.
Empresa de Cobre de Angola.	1944 1950	All minerals <i>except</i> diamonds, petrol, oils, bituminous and gaseous hydrocarbons.	59,000 sq. km 14° E/15° 15°E and 8° 30' S. Extended 1952 to include 13° 10' E and 7° 10' S.
Cia Mineira do Lobito.	1949	All minerals <i>except</i> as above.	49,000 sq. km 14° 30' and 10° 30' E 12° and 14° S.

(These two companies between them handle Angolan copper.)

Cia de Combustiveis do Lobito (Carborang)	1952	Liquid and gaseous hydrocarbons, esp. petrol.	NW corner of Angola and a shallow area reaching sea at Novo Redondo and S. of Ambriz.
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The giant among these companies is, of course, the famous Diamang. Formed in 1917 as the Portuguese branch of the Anglo-American Diamond Corporation Ltd., it gained its exclusive concession in 1921. "It is exempt from taxes, pays no import duties on its mine machinery and no export duties on diamonds, and has at its exclusive disposal the African work force of the Lunda area".\*

\*Duffy, op. cit.

The initial capital (some \$2,540,90) was divided between a 40% majority holding in "American hands", another 40% among various English and Belgian concerns, and 5% only for the Angola government. The parties were: The Anglo-American Corporation (S. Africa Ltd.), the Oppenheimer group, the Morgan Bank, De Beers, Guggenheim, T. F. Ryan, Forminière, the Union Minière du Haut-Katanga, the Guaranty Trust Bank, and the Société Générale de Belgique. Subsequently, capital has been raised to some 11 million dollars, and the Angola government now holds 11.5%. During the period 1953–57, the government received 16,870,000 dollars in dividends and bonuses. Diamang's net profit in the following year was 75,454,337 escudos (£2,193,179). The petrol concessionary, the Lobito Fuel Oil Company (Carborang), is 70% owned by the Belgian Petrofina company (Compagnie Financière Beige de Petrole), who also provide "technical assistance". Licensed in 1952, Carborang was granted powers by the Governor-General in October 1957, to set up the Companhia de Petroleos de Angola with a capital of 25,500,000 dollars: 45% to be held by Petrofina (linked to Royal Dutch), 1,750,000 dollars to be held by the government of Angola, and the rest to be shared between four Portuguese banks (although one of them, the Banco Burnay, is in fact a subsidiary of the Belgian Société Générale). There is a similar division of interest in the Companhia Concessionaria de Petroleos de Angola, whose 16,500 shares are split between Carborang (11.76%) and the banking trinity, Banco de Angola, Banco Burnay, and the Banco Espirito Santo e Commercial de Lisboa. Belgium is not the only country interested in Angola's petroleum resources, however. In June 1958, the Cabinda Gulf Oil Company, backed by the Gulf Oil Company, the Chase National Bank and the National City Bank of New York, secured an exclusive contract for three years prospecting and 50 years exploitation of the Cabinda enclave, in return for a ground rent and guaranteed expenditure of three million dollars in the first three years. The profitability of these concessions is immense: Carborang's capital in 1958 was only 1,925,000 dollars, yet profits were 1,138,620 dollars.

The two copper companies mentioned in the table are in fact mainly Portuguese in ownership. Manganese production on the other hand is wholly in the hands of Messrs. Louise A. Thérèse Berman, who have associated with them two other concessionary companies, Lay et Frères and Sociedade Commercial J. Fernandes. Aluminium is the natural domain of Péchiney, which operates through Alumínio Português. Billiton Maatschappij (Holland) has the bauxite monopoly; iron ore finds the Companhia Mineira do Lobito working alongside such partners as Krupps of Essen.

Mining, then, is very largely in foreign hands or under foreign management. Diamonds, petrol and oil, manganese, bauxite, aluminium and iron ore are wholly or partially exploited by foreign corporations. The development agencies themselves are major companies such as the Hydro-technical Corporation of New York, the Aero Service Corporation, Bethlehem Steel, and Carbide Inc.

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Sugar (and its derivative, alcohol) is rapidly expanding, and a sugar factory with a capacity of some 40,000 tons per annum is being built at Luanda. There is European capital participation in all the sugar companies—Companhia do Açucar de Angola, Companhia Agricola do Cassequel and the Sociedade do Comercio e Construções. In 1958, the Companhia Agricola do Cassequel had a capital of \$6,125,000, and paid out just under one million dollars in profits; its majority shareholder is Barton Mayhew & Co. The cement industry, at present entirely devoted to the home market, is foreign-invested through the Companhia de Cimentos de Angola. Textang in Luanda manages the very small textile industry; though it is known to have been set up with Belgian and Dutch capital, no precise figures are available. The vegetable oil industry is jointly controlled by Industrias Angolanas de Oleos Vegetais (Induve), which is closely associated with CUF, and the French-dominated CADA.

The only Transangolan railroad is the Benguela Railway, which follows the route of the old slave traders down to the coast. It was founded in 1902 by Sir Robert Williams on a 99-year lease with an initial capital of £3,000,000. Only 10% of the shares were held by the Portuguese government. The dominant investor is the British concern, Tanganyika Concessions, which has invested in it a total of around 30 million dollars. The railroad has been vastly profitable to its stockholders, and in normal times is a reliable source of customs revenue for the administration.

Emphasis has been laid upon the Angolan situation partly because it is in Angola that revolution has taken place, partly because its economic complexes are much larger than those of the other 'provinces'. However, Portugal's other major African colony shows a somewhat similar structure. Mozambique's main export earnings in 1959 and 1960 run as follows:

### Main Export Commodities: Mozambique

	1959		1960	
	<i>mill.</i>		<i>mill.</i>	
	<i>tons</i>	<i>escudos</i>	<i>tons</i>	<i>escudos</i>
Cotton ... ..	22,974	353.7	31,239	481.2
Sugar ... ..	86,667	222.3	87,080	213.8
Cashew nuts ... ..	43,637	121.8	46,699	161.7
Copra ... ..	35,797	201.3	34,703	170.6
Tea ... ..	7,518	144.0	7,608	140.9
Sisal ... ..	21,509	115.0	20,323	132.7
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total (with others)	424,948	1,747	417,706	1,859
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>

The pattern of exploitation is similar—British capital owns two of the three large sugar concessions (the third is Portuguese), includ-

ing the famous Sena estates. In 1948 the petroleum concession was granted to the Mozambique Gulf Oil Company. Coal mining, centred on Moatize, is predominantly Belgian-capitalized: 60% of the capital of the Compagnie de Charbons de Mozambique is held by the Société Minière et Géologique Belge, 30% is held by the Mozambique Company, the remaining 10% by the government. Of the three banks of Mozambique only one—the Banco Nacional Ultramarino—is Portuguese; the other two are Barclays DSO, and the Standard Bank of South Africa. Of the 23 Insurance companies, nine are non-Portuguese. Till 1942 all insurance undertaken in the province was in foreign hands. Then tax and other regulations led “many foreign companies, including British ones, to withdraw from the field”. Despite this retreat, 80% of life-insurance is still in the hands of foreign companies (Vaughan, HMSO 1951). The new Lourenco Marques oil refinery is being constructed by the Sociedade Nacional de Refinação de Petróleo (SONAREP), a Franco-Portuguese syndicate; the construction work went to Procon, a British firm with a large American interest. The Government of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland is also being given an interest in order that a link section may be built to join the new refinery going up at Salisbury. Portuguese, British, German and Swiss capital is invested in sisal plantations, while copra is mainly Portuguese with some Swiss and a little French capital.

The massive role of foreign capital in the exploitation of Portugal’s colonial resources is unmistakable. The concessions operate through special bi-lateral negotiations with the Portuguese authorities. Mixed companies are formed with a modicum of Portuguese capital and a maximum of Portuguese day-to-day management. Foreign-financed firms obligatorily make bloc share-holdings over to the government as a condition of their licence. Metropolitan or ‘provincial’ registration, under Portuguese titles, is usual. Yet beneath these formalities the power of foreign capital amounts to what might be termed a ‘covert condominium’. The ‘condominium’ is latent in Angola and Mozambique. The *de facto* power of foreign big capital makes it the peer of the administration. But the corporations confine themselves to their own sphere: they do not exercise their power politically. They have no need to. The concessionary companies enjoy huge profits from their privileged vantage-points in the colonial economy. The Salazarist state ensures the bureaucratic and military conditions of profitability, and is paid in return.\* The corporations provide the capital the administration lacks: the administration provides the order the corporations need. The profits are shared. The arrangement is eminently satisfactory to both sides. The companies have no need to intervene in policy-making as such. In this sense, the condominium has never ‘crystallized’. As long as the interests of the companies and the administration coincide, there is no reason

\*The diversity of foreign interests—American, British, German, French, Belgian, Swiss, Dutch, Japanese, etc.—obviously allows the regime a margin of manoeuvre in its economic diplomacy with them. But only up to a point: a crisis can realize the unity of competing foreign interests in an imperial situation almost instantly. The Boxer rebellion in China is instructive in this respect.

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why it should do so. However, as the Portuguese regime becomes increasingly threatened, the companies can be expected to adopt different policies. Already, there is a tension inherent in the situation of technologically-capable, internationally-affiliated capital operating in a milieu of violence and archaism: the rational and 'progressive' potential of corporate capital is limited and frustrated. The tension can be seen in the grievances of Portuguese settlers and administrators against Diamang, which, reflecting its kinship to the Forminière mines across the border in South Kasai, has tended to form an enclave of (still derisory) paternalism in north-eastern Angola: the company is accused of "creating a state within a state" and "sapping the native". When the regime enters its final days, foreign capital will try to detach itself from Portugal, and to conjugate condominium into neo-colonialism under conditions of independence.

The "covert condominium" concludes the system of Portuguese colonialism. It reveals the same debility as the existence of white unemployed, the same impotence as the use of forced labour, the same dependence for which the ideology tries to compensate, the same paralysis as the failure of Catholicism. The facets of ultra-colonialism form a unified system, a single social and historical phenomenon: one anachronism and one oppression. The place of foreign capital in Portuguese colonialism is unique. No other colonial system has ever permitted such a dispossession from within. And yet this astonishing anomaly is the final, logical outcome of the reflex-colonization of the nineteenth century. Launched on its imperial course by ideology rather than industry resorting to blind force for exploitation in the absence of technology, Portuguese colonialism has ended in a humiliating compact with the very foreigners against whom it was born as a riposte. Seventy years after the Berlin Conference and the Rose-Coloured Map, Anglo-American, Krupp and Péchiney prosper in the territory conquered by Couceiro and de Paiva to rival England, Germany and France. The impossible adventure of ultra-colonialism ends, with irony and inevitability, in its own exact negation.

*(A final section will deal with the Angolan insurrection)*